How peer production and Web3 governance mechanisms may prefigure a Isonomic world order
Is what we are waiting for perhaps not Democracy, but Isonomia ?
Readers of this Substack may know that I am a big ‘fan’ of the ideas of Kojin Karatani, as expressed in his pivotal work, The Structure of World History. It has a central place in our P2P Foundation book: Peer to Peer: The Commons Manifesto. I have explained this in a video conversation.
The essential move by Karatani in this book is to move away from the Marxist understanding of ‘modes of production’ (hunter-gathering, craft-agrarian, industrial, cognitive), to ‘modes of exchange’.
Here he explains his motivation:
Kojin Karatani:
"I proposed the notion of switching “from modes of production to modes of exchange” in The Structure of World History (2010; English trans. 2014). Here, I would like to provide a simple explanation of this. Orthodox Marxist theory, using an architectural metaphor, explains the history of social forms in terms of modes of production, which form the economic base (foundation), and of the political or ideational superstructures that are determined by that base. A mode of production consists of the productive forces, which arise from the relations between humans and nature, and the relations of production, which are constituted by the relations between humans. I do not oppose the idea that the history of social forms is determined by the economic base, but in my view that base consists not of modes of production, but rather modes of exchange. What I call modes of exchange includes both relations between nature and humans and relations between humans.1 I came to see things this way as a result of various critiques that were mounted in response to problems in the Marxist view that modes of production constituted the economic base—critiques that ultimately resulted in a rejection of the idea of an economic base.
This does not amount to a rejection of Marx. At the stage of writing The German Ideology, Marx himself used the expression “productive forces and intercourse,” not “productive forces and relations of production.” The concept of intercourse (Verkehr) includes relations of production, transportation, trade, sexual intercourse and even war. In other words, it includes all the various types of “exchange” that occur among communities.Accordingly, the various forms that I call modes of exchange can be said to correspond to what Marx called intercourse. A perspective centered on modes of production (productive forces and relations of production) fails to see that the relation between people and nature is itself a form of exchange (metabolism) and as a result loses sight of the ecological awareness that was included in Marx’s use of the term."
(http://www.kojinkaratani.com/en/pdf/An_Introduction_to_Modes_of_Exchange.pdf)
In his understanding, the evolution of the human world order is best interpreted in the following way:
Originally , Mode A predominated, which is the value exchange involved with the so-called gift economy. I should note that by doing this, in my view, he does conflate to different modes, i.e. both Equality Matching, the gift economy proper in which you have to give back the gift in some way, and Communal Sharehold, in which you contribute to a whole from which you benefit (no gift back is expected). Still, Mode A works fine, since they indeed occur together in tribal, kinship-based, hunter-gathering and horticultural societies (and as David Graeber would insist, in my early agricultural societies as well).
Mode B occurs when there is a situation of domination, for example after conquest. After that moment the exchange is really between protection in exchange for taxation and surplus, but compensated by redistribution. This new mode creates what we call civilization, with its division between managerial and productive classes.
Mode C occurs when the market exchange form become dominant, as under the current political economy of capitalism.
But Karatani doesn’t stop there. He introduces a Mode D. Because tribal conviviality is so necessary to human happiness, there is a continuous yearning in Mode B and C, to return to Mode A, but at a ‘higher level’. This means that most people want to return to this conviviality, but without losing all the advantages of civilizational life.
This yearning is represented by the world religions, which express the yearnings of the working masses, aided by spiritual reformers. While they never win outright, and transform towards imperial religions eventually, they can obtain civilizational effects, i.e. balancing out the most destructive proclivities of warrior classes for example. One could say that the civilizational forms that came out of the Axial Age, had such an effect.
I’d like now to refer to my own work and one of its central arguments, which is an echo of this hypothesis by Kojin Karatani: that the current technological infrastructure indeed creates the capacity to do exactly that, i.e. the scaling of gifting and commoning. With digital networks, we create the ability to create and exchange value, based on gifting labor to common projects, coordinated through social signals, based on free permissionless contributions, while at the same time, creating global knowledge commons to undergird that common work. If you are familiar with my theses, you know that I claim the following:
We are creating a ‘fourth order sector of organizations’, which are integrative, meta-organizations: they have the capacity to coordinate both market forms, participation by public authorities, voluntary input by NGO’s, but crucially, the new form of permissionless contributions.
I have historicized this as follows:
Open source / free software / open design has created the capacity for the mutual coordination of labor on a global scale, relatively autonomous from the full control of market and state institutions
Crypto and Web3 has created the capacity to finance such work, and is succeeding in self-infrastructure through the self-taxation for the production of public goods
I also stress the provisional nature of such emerging infrastructure which has not yet full merged with physical production. This is the argument in my Substack editorial, ‘Crypto for Real’.
Now, if you are familiar with the mechanics of open source, peer production, and Web3 blockchain governance, you will notice that while there is a lot of freedom and consensus in these communities, they are most of the time, not formally democratic! So what are they doing ? One concept you might use, is that of Polycentric Governance, which was defined by Elinor Ostrom as the governance modality of the Commons. It stresses the need for the mutual alignment of the different stakeholders, and there is an excellent overview of how Blockchain communities have been applying these principles, see the report, Blockchain Technology and Polycentric Governance.
But, THERE IS A LOT MORE GOING ON, and to understand that, it is necessary to refer to a second important book by Kojin Karatani, entitled ‘Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy’.
This is a book about history, with a remarkable thesis: the origins of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are not to be sought in ancient Athens, as many believe, but in the cities of the Ionian coast, many centuries before.
Before we continue, this is the book presentation by the publisher, just to give you a first idea:
"In Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy—published originally in Japanese and now available in four languages—Kōjin Karatani questions the idealization of ancient Athens as the source of philosophy and democracy by placing the origins instead in Ionia, a set of Greek colonies located in present-day Turkey. Contrasting Athenian democracy with Ionian isonomia—a system based on non-rule and a lack of social divisions whereby equality is realized through the freedom to immigrate—Karatani shows how early Greek thinkers from Heraclitus to Pythagoras were inseparably linked to the isonomia of their Ionian origins, not democracy. He finds in isonomia a model for how an egalitarian society not driven by class antagonism might be put into practice, and resituates Socrates's work and that of his intellectual heirs as the last philosophical attempts to practice isonomia's utopic potentials. Karatani subtly interrogates the democratic commitments of Western philosophy from within and argues that the key to transcending their contradictions lies not in Athenian democracy, with its echoes of imperialism, slavery, and exclusion, but in the openness of isonomia."
(https://www.dukeupress.edu/isonomia-and-the-origins-of-philosophy)
What exactly is the argument, and why is it important ?
Greek democracy is a response to the crisis of tribal confederations that became class societies. Very specifically, the Athenian democracy was born from a revolt against debt slavery. Democracy is always a class compromise, in which the oligarchy agrees to share political power, on the condition that the inequality based on property, remains untouched. This is also the case for the medieval free cities, which were originally under the control of the Church and the monarch or local feudal lords, but needed to accept guild rule to maintain social stability. Athens and other democratic poleis happily co-existed with slavery , and needed the income from imperial expansion, to fund its redistributional policies. It is of course not different with the current western democracies that were coextensive with colonial and imperial expansion. Political equality is matched to economic inequality and inevitably, the power of money gets the upper hand on the power of the vote.
The conditions in Ionian cities were different: they were based not on tribal confederations, but on people who had left their tribal areas, and who were able to farm land around their cities. The crucial element, according to Karatani, was the ‘right to leave’; so if there was an authoritarian or oligarchic tendency, its citizens would leave for another city, and this was a powerful motivation to maintain civic consensus and broad economic equality. Karatani makes the important argument that these cities were trading and market cities, but because there was no state creating monopolies and therefore surplus profits that could be accumulated, the cities remained egalitarian for several centuries. This is interesting by itself, as the market forms are linked here to egalitarian outcomes, unlike the slave-based economies of the Attican cities on the mainland. Karatani sees the same conditions apply in the farmer communities of Iceland, refugees from the militaristic Vikings, and in the religious dissident townships of the early American Northeast. Neither of these systems lasted forever, and the Ionian cities succumbed to the Lydian and then later to the Persian empire. But they lasted several centuries, as long as democratic systems lasted. But here is my invitation, look at the ‘mobility’ condition that made Isonomia possible as a form of ‘forking’.
Indeed, let us now look back at the very characteristics of peer production.
Peer production, the capacity of any individual contributor to permissionlessly contribute to a common project, allows precisely the same type of mobility. Hence, peer production communities, even if they are under a certain influence of corporations, always maintain a relative autonomy for their sharing cultures. If a contributor is not happy, he can fork the project. Yes, open software is to a certain degree, assimilated under capitalist logics, but without destroying the original freedom of participation.
Now let’s look at Web3, blockchain and crypto: they are still based on open source software, and on permissionless contributions; contributors can leave the projects, and fork new ones if necessary.
they generally apply polycentric governance mechanisms. DAO’s have instituted new forms of voting and funding, ‘quadratic voting and quadratic funding’, which balance out the power of funders, founders, developers and other stakeholder communities, based on contributory logics.
So it is rather clear that what peer production and blockchain projects are applying are not specifically democratic procedures, although there are some, but they are essentially, ISONOMIC PROJECTS.
In conclusion:
Web3, despite its relation with financial and market forces, is practicing Isonomia.
If we now go back to the larger point of Kojin Karatani, and to my own convictions, then yes, we can conclude that what is happening now is a scaling up of Mode A dynamics, to a Mode D dynamic.
Networked technologies hold the promise of a re-instantiation of the Isonomic processes of Ionia. I am not saying this is a given, despite current progress, but it is certainly a possibility.
What if we could look at crypto and Web3 as the ‘communities of faith’, an updated form of the world religions which previously attempted the realization of Mode D ? Perhaps more is needed than a mere belief in common autonomous infrastructures, perhaps we also need more substantive spiritual transformations, but still, the potential of the current evolutions should not be discounted.
Interesting quotes from Karatani, thanks, and how it applies to P2P.
Seven separate points:
1.
As you know, I don't hold much for describing world history on any single-variable reductionism--whether derived from any economic reductionism or not, as they are all the same argument about one variable (economic organization) determining or causing all other different organizational issues), whether 'modes of production' or 'modes of exchange.' Instead, I tend to see in world history 'modes (sic) of jurisdictional alliances' where the same organizational dynamics defined as 'leaderships and followers accommodating over the ongoing adjustable deal in-between'. This pattern holds to describe all kinds of organizations autonomously without requiring one to define the others. This means all organizations are organized the same like this--whether politics, markets/economic firms, religious institutions, and financial currency relationships. Some get more representative, while others can get more representative in other words. All can get more representative at the same time as well, which is what I think/interpret you are talking about here.
2.
Plus, in this 'modes of jurisdictional alliances', a geographical/trialectical dynamic is how this plays out over time. This means three kinds of more geographic jurisdictional alliances, in trialectical dynamics with and against each other define world history. These same dynamics occur over world history at larger scales so far at least--and with a collapse in the midst of it typically, similar to what "D" above means.
Related:
Seminar on Trialectics: A Better Social and Socio-Environmental Systems Theory, by Mark D. Whitaker
https://youtu.be/6UDazzvjanY?si=5I_4Pclrfwi05CML
3. On Karatani's four types A B C D, this I think is better described as A, B/C (without C autonomous), and D.
I quibble whether there is ever a real separation between Karatani's B and C (is there ever really a 'market form' distinct from the political economies of B around it?). So, I kind of feel that B always exists with C instead of ever separate. Call it A, B/C, and D. Nothing called mode C by itself; the C of the past 500 or so years is just an ongoing B/C mix of plural European empires globally dominating in various ways economic, military technology, communication technologies, etc.). Particularly before and after 1815, European empires start to consolidate into the UK and also-ran France, globally, then by late 1800s the expansion of Germany as well, and then by 1890s onward Russian empire across Eurasia, yet after 1919 starts to consolidate into various attempts at world governmental structures from European elites (USSR as a global revolution / League of Nations that had their own ‘imperial’ mandates remember / then U.N. post WWII with its own international army and its attempts to own all nuclear weapons (that failed), etc.), to the Cold War where there is a breakdown of even fewer B/C empires of UN, USA, and USSR. Then, the military consolidation of China particularly after 1990s globally in trading networks and debt severance linked to Chinese global empire attempts now. So all this time, no, hardly ever a 'pure C' is ever in place. It is just a deduction from the special pleading to keep economic reductionism in world history analysis. Which I think can be dispensed with.
4.
Quoting you on Karatani: "This yearning is represented by the world religions, which express the yearnings of the working masses, aided by spiritual reformers [I would add in contexts of collapses of B/C weakness]. While they never win outright...."
?
Well no, x, they DO regularly win outright, yet sometimes more by default, i.e., in the context of weak B/C empires disorganized by lack of elite agreement of how to proceed against them and ever weaker in their extraction capacities to maintain themselves. Sometimes such "D" periods are hundreds of years. However, they are regularly only highly regionally organized, and even against each other "D" forms as much as against past empire or future empire attempts at military consolidation. Therefore, it is easier for a return of military consolidation of B/C systems upon all these D's, so D becomes crushed and integrated because it is regularly already divided and conquered under itself. Outliers where multiple D zones do coordinate at higher levels are like the Swiss Confederation rules, Iroquois Confederacy, and early United States (pre Civil War)]
Thus extractive/subsidy based coercive states ("B/C") and their extraction slave systems collapse and end repeatedly, when they lack the inputs of the subsidies to keep them anymore and where elites themselves unsure what path of future to take, so they divide up themselves making their empires weaker. Both points lead toward periods of more "regionalized ‘D’ everywhere"--***by default of ending of B/C strength** as much as growing of D issues mentioned.
5.
Agree with this:
• We are creating a ‘fourth order sector of organizations’, which are integrative, meta-organizations: they have the capacity to coordinate both market forms, participation by public authorities, voluntary input by NGO’s, but crucially, the new form of permissionless contributions.
I have historicized this as follows... [which is a good summary!].... Indeed, let us now look back at the very characteristics of peer production. Peer production, the capacity of any individual contributor to permissionlessly contribute to a common project, allows precisely the same type of mobility. Hence, peer production communities, even if they are under a certain influence of corporations, always maintain a relative autonomy for their sharing cultures. If a contributor is not happy, he can fork the project. So it is rather clear that what peer production and blockchain projects are applying are not specifically democratic procedures, although there are some, but they are essentially, ISONOMIC PROJECTS. [Well said.]
6. On the lack of technological determinism though on digital technologies
"Networked technologies hold the promise of a re-instantiation of the Isonomic processes of Ionia. I am not saying this is a given, despite current progress, but it is certainly a possibility."
Digital technology is not so technologically deterministic. Digital networks can create very unrepresentative technocracies of social credit systems linked to digital currencies and ending of digital free speech and IOT permissions of your own 'products' (like turning off cars remotely, etc.) like the USA, EU, and China are doing, instead of digital technologies applied now only toward the (desired) decentralized and representative ideas you mentioned that are possible with these digital technologies organized/networked in a different way.
7. Parallels of Bauwens and Mozi? :-)
"What if we could look at crypto and Web3 as the ‘communities of faith’, an updated form of the world religions which previously attempted the realization of Mode D ? "
Yes, just as Mozi's writings were half religious and half technical defense works, Bauwens' works are the same merging of a spirit of universalism merged with the hard materialism of technical requirements for maintaining that universalism as autonomous from encroaching empires. Same as Mozi! So, look into Mozi for inspiration and parallels. The Chinese Han dynasty as it consolidated across Southern China tried their best to entirely eliminate Mozi and its 'isonomia' of independent city/states of voluntarist 'universal love' and 'defense technologies against empire' from the historical records of the later Han dynasties and beyond.
Interesting.
I wonder if starting from scratch, like on Mars, how we'd develop such an Isonomic civilisation.